haviour of children amuses us it isn't simply because we feel superior to them, nor are obscene allusions funny simply because we feel above sexual matters, for if we feel very much above them we are unlikely to find the allusions humorous. In other cases feelings of superiority do not seem to be involved at all, in word-plays and puns, for example, and in nonsense rhymes and words like 'runcible', that are amusing in themselves. To say that in these cases we feel superior to the words or rhymes seems strained and implausible. Again, the humour of absurd Goon-style behaviour is hardly to be found in any superiority we may feel as people who behave more rationally.
(2) 'Relief from restraint' theories. It is equally difficult to account for the humour in children's behaviour, word-plays and nonsense on these theories. The sort of case which does fit quite well is the amusement evoked by oaths, but again it is objected that oaths are not funny because they provide relief from restraint.
(3) Incongruity theories-the humorous as the incongruous. The same types of objection have been produced against these. In the first place there are many cases of incongruity which are not humorous, including those in this liberal collection of Bain's, who wrote:
'There are many incongruities that may produce anything but a laugh. A decrepit man under a heavy burden, fives loaves and two fishes among a multitude, and all unfitness and gross disproportion; an instrument out of tune, a fly in ointment, snow in May, Archimedes studying geometry in a siege, and all discordant things; a wolf in sheep's clothing, a breach of bargain, and falsehood in general; the multitude taking the law into their own hands, and everything of the nature of disorder; a corpse at a feast, parental cruelty, filial ingratitude, and whatever is unnatural; the entire catalogue of vanities given by Solomon,-are all incongruous, but they cause feelings of pain, anger, sadness, loathing, rather than mirth'. (The Emotions and the Will, pp. 282-3.) Nowadays perhaps some of these would seem funny to some people in some contexts-there are changing fashions in humour; but it could scarcely be maintained that all of Bain's examples are invariably amusing to everyone.
Again, those instances of incongruity which are humorous are not always found humorous just because of the incongruity. Why are we amused by the behaviour of our own children and not by the same behaviour in other people's children ? Presumably because our own children are more endearing to us. Many jokes are effective because of their topicality and are completely unfunny when their references cease to be topical.
The three classes of theory which I have mentioned are certainly not exhaustive and three of the most famous accounts of humour fit into them uneasily. Bergson's view that the source of humour is human inflexibility in social life is akin to the superiority theories, but it is less easy to PHILOSOPHY attack since he is sensitive to the many varieties of humour and does not insist that every case rigidly fits this description; he claims only to have described the leitmotif of the humorous. Freud's theory is very complex and provides different accounts for different types of humour. The sort he calls 'wit' is supposed to involve the gratification of repressed desiresa form of relief from restraint. Kant's view that amusement is frustrated expectation is closest to the incongruity theories. Without qualification it is quite obviously inadequate, for the humour of many comedy situations depends on the audience's knowing precisely what is going to happen. (Those who are familiar with the record by Gerald HofTnung on which he impersonates a builder's mate will have a very good example of this.) II There can be no adequate account of the notion of humour without one of the notion of amusement. For the humorous is so characterised in virtue of the human attitude or response to it: we call something 'humorous' if it is apt to, or should or deserves to, amuse people, or some special sort of person. By 'amusement' here I do not, of course, mean trivial diversion of any sort, I am using the word in the narrower sense in which amusement is amusement at the humorous or comic or witty. In this paper, then, I shall approach the question 'What is humour?' via the question 'What is amusement?'
As a preliminary it is necessary to introduce two pieces of logical apparatus, each of some antiquity. The first, which is due to Aristotle, is too well known to need any exposition. It is the genus-species schema: the members of a species belong to a proper subset of the members of a genus. Species are denned within a genus by means of the essential characteristics which distinguish them from other species, i.e., by their differentiae.
The second piece of apparatus is less well-known and less ancient. It involves the concepts of material and formal object, which have recently been exhumed from medieval metaphysics by Dr. A. J. Kenny. Suppose we have a sentence-frame 'Someone qf d-' where V is a verb-variable. The gap can be filled by various descriptions of objects. If V is 'clean' you can significantly replace the dash by 'his car', for example, or 'his shoes', 'the windows', 'the floors'; less informatively you can substitute 'something dirty'. If 'q>' is 'dry' you can substitute 'his car', 'his clothes', 'his face'...; or less informatively you can put 'something wet'. If V is 'divorce', you can put 'Mary' or 'the president of the club'; less informatively, 'his spouse'. The last suggestion in each case is less informative because you know that no one can (logically) <b an object unless it satisfies that description: he can clean only objects which are dirty, dry only what is wet, divorce (in one sense) only someone who is his spouse. These relatively uninformative descriptions are said to specify formal objects (the others specify material objects). More technically, a description 'P' specifies the formal object of q> ing (being p' d by) if and only if (i) (Someone ^o' s /is q>'d by a) entails, but is not entailed by, (a is P). This at any rate is the account that Kenny wants to give of the notion. He says:
(iK) 'The formal object of q> ing is the object under that description which must apply to it if it is to be possible to <p it. If only what is P can be <p'd, then 'thing which is P' gives the formal object of <p ing' (Action, Emotion and Will, London, 1962, p. 189) . However, this is not entirely satisfactory. Where the formal object is specified by modalizing the relevant verb ('the edible', for example, gives the formal object of eating) no difficulty may arise. But such trivial specifications are not very interesting. The trouble is that if we are looking for an interesting specification we shall, in many cases at least, have different alternatives to choose from. For it is a consequence of the above definitions that, if 'that which is P' gives the formal object of <p ing and (a is P) entails (a is Q), 'that which is Q' also gives the formal object of <p ing; and at least where the entailment is not mutual, that is where (a is Q) doesn't entail (a is P), the description 'Q' will not be equivalent in any relevant sense to 'P'. For example, (Someone divorces a) entails (a is his spouse), so that 'his own spouse' would give the formal object of divorcing. But (a is his spouse) entails (a is a human being). So (Someone divorces a) entails (a is a human being), and the description 'human being' seems to givet he formal object of q> ing. In other words, if we define 'formal object' in the manner of Kenny, we have no right to talk of the (one and only) formal object of, for example, divorcing.
What we want, it might be thought, is the most specific description substitutable for 'P' (for a given value of <p) in (i) to produce a true statement. The narrowest description would be one entailed by every other description whose substitution produced a true statement. But if we ignore the trivial specifications-like 'the edible' for eating-and their close synonyms, I doubt whether it will always be possible to find the narrowest description. Only a sentient being can (logically) be divorced, but only if he is a human being, and only if the human being is the spouse of the divorcer, and only if he goes through what is taken to be a legally acceptable procedure, and so on. How far are we to stop short of the specification of the class of people who actually are divorced? Out of context there may be no answer to this question. Must we, then, abandon talk of the formal object of <p ing ?
A way of avoiding this conclusion is suggested in subsequent remarks by Kenny himself. He says:
'One way in which a species of action may be differentiated from other species of the same genus is by a difference in its formal object. Thus if we take (voluntary) killing as a genus, homicide differs from other species in this genus as being the killing of a human being; if we take homicide as a genus, murder differs from other species in this genus as being the killing of an innocent human being [sic] . If we take making as a genus, then cobbling differs from tailoring because the formal object of the one is footwear and the other is clothes ' (pp. cit., pp. 190-1 ). The species is specified by the conjunction of two specifications: (1) of the genus, (2) of the differentia(e). In these cases (2) is a specification of the formal object of the species. The formal object is uniquely determined by the genus under consideration-although there may be a number of different synonymous descriptions which give it. In the light of the considerations above it may well be that the formal object of <p ing cannot be specified until a genus of which <p ing is a species is also specified, and that g> ing may have different formal objects according to the genus under which it is being considered. The notion of formal object can now be given as follows:
(ii) Specifying the formal object of <p ing/being <p'd by for a genus of which <p ing/being g>'d by is a species is specifying the differentia(e) of that species within the genus where the species is being differentiated solely in terms of the object of <p ing. If 'that which is P' delimits the species, q> ing, within the genus in such a way, then this expression gives the formal object of <p ing. It is a consequence of (ii) that talk of the formal object of an act etc. is appropriate only when we have a concept for a genus of which that act may be regarded as a species. Definitions which involve specifying formal objects are definitions of that traditionally respectable variety, definitions per genus et differentiam. If a species has no single set of differentiae (like game as a species of activity), then it will have no clear-cut formal object. In such cases it may well be that any talk of formal objects is misleading.
There is, in general, no such thing as the genus of a given activity, there is a hierarchy of genera; e.g. the species philosophy lecture falls under each of the following genera:-lecture, instruction, communication (ideally), behaviour. Since almost any activity can be considered under different genera, it can have different formal objects. If anyone claims that 'thing which is P' gives the formal object of <p ing, it always makes sense, I suggest, to ask, 'Under what genus?' Ill I think that it is illuminating to think of some traditional theories of humour as attempts to specify the formal object of amusement. Thought of in this way they will not be treated as complete accounts, since the genus under which amusement (that is, being amused by) is being considered has not been made clear. In setting forth my revised incongruity theory my procedure will be to introduce a plausible candidate for formal object of being amused by and then to consider the genus under which it must be understood. I will suggest that it is an essential feature of any object of S's amusement that it should be seen as incongruous by S. In other words
HUMOUR AND INCONGRUITY
'that which is seen as incongruous' gives the formal object of being amused by. A related view can be found in Aristotle and one has been put forward more recently by Schopenhauer, part of whose account I shall quote, because he also goes a little way towards clarifying the notion of incongruity:
'The cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought through it in some relation, and laughter itself is just the expression of this incongruity. It often occurs in this way: two or more real objects are thought through one concept, and the identity of the concept is transferred to the objects: it then becomes strikingly apparent from the entire difference of the objects in other respects, that the concept was only applicable to them from a one-sided point of view. It occurs just as often, however, that the incongruity between a single real object and the concept under which, from one point of view, it has rightly been subsumed, is suddenly felt. Now the more correct the subsumption of such objects under a concept may be from one point of view, and the greater and more glaring their incongruity with it from another point of view, the greater is the ludicrous effect which is produced by this contrast. All laughter then is occasioned by a paradox, and therefore by unexpected subsumption, whether this is expressed in words or in actions. This, briefly stated, is the true explanation of the ludicrous.' (The World as Will and Idea, 1,13.) I would substitute 'object of amusement' for 'cause of laughter', since, clearly, not every outburst of laughter is occasioned by the humorous, e.g., laughing when tickled, hysterical laughter, laughter under nitrous oxide; nor does every man always express his amusement by laughing. Secondly, I would replace the narrower term 'ludicrous' or 'laughable' ('Lacherlich') by 'amusing', because I believe that (apparent) incongruity 1 may be an essential feature not merely of what we would call the 'ludicrous' but of all types of humour. Now Schopenhauer's account suggests the following (a priori) thesis: (T) If an event/state of affairs etc. amuses someone, then he sees it as involving the incongruous subsumption of one or more instances under a single concept. Notice that I say he sees it as involving incongruous subsumption. Whether the object really involves incongruity is immaterial; indeed it is not even necessary for the amused person to believe that what is amusing him is incongruous-all he needs to do is to see it in that way. Someone who watched a gesticulating politician on television with the volume turned down so that he couldn't hear him, might try thinking of what he saw as the politician trying to sing a popular song, and then find what he was watching amusing; but he needn't believe that he is really watching an important politician singing a popular song. Kenny says:
"The description of the formal object of a mental attitude such as an emotion, unlike a description of the formal object of a non-intentional PHILOSOPHY action, [i.e., an action which has no intentional object] must contain reference to a belief. Only what is wet can be dried: but something which is merely believed to be an insult may provoke anger ' (op. cit., pp. 193-4) . He is surely wrong in thinking that this applies to all mental attitudes. Amusement need not contain that sort of reference to a belief, only to the way the object is perceived or thought of. I do not know whether what Kenny says would be true if for 'reference to a belief you substituted 'reference to a belief or to the way the object is perceived or thought of, though it does seem plausible.
It is worth trying thesis (T) out on a few examples. Obviously I cannot expect to be able to substantiate my thesis in this way-a few examples prove nothing positive, for they may be tendentious; my intention is only to illustrate the thesis. Consider the following story:
(a) One day, it is said, Sir Isaiah Berlin went to a magnificent concert at the Sheldonian Theatre and, as he was leaving, Professor Ryle happened to be passing BlackwelFs. Ryle hailed him and shouted, 'Hallo, Isaiah. Been listening to some tunes, then?' The subsumption of mere tunes under the concept of symphony music is clearly incongruous. It is, of course, not always easy to say precisely under which concept the illicit subsumption is being made, because it need not be mentioned in a description of the object of amusement. There are the added complications that different people, and even the same man, may find the same thing amusing for different reasons. Consider a few more examples:
(b) Conservative Party spokesman: 'The Conservative Party is always ready to provide an alternative to Government.' (c) 'G. E. Moore doing philosophy is like a man dancing in treacle.' (d) 'The time has come, the walrus said, To talk of many things, Of shoes and ships and sealing wax, Of cabbages and kings . . . ' (e) A woman asked a shopkeeper recently for a small packet of a certain product. She was given a packet marked 'Large'. The shopkeeper explained that the firm made three sizes, 'Super', 'Giant', and 'Large', the last being the smallest. (b) is funny because the spokesman should have said something different. Perhaps we might describe it as the subsumption of an utterance of a remark inimical to one's cause under the concept of utterances typically made by spokesmen and favourable to their causes. This may sound objectionably artificial, but talk about concepts and their instances often sounds artificial, and, although it may be healthy for us to suspect unnatural sounding accounts which philosophers attempt to foist on us, it is surely at least as unhealthy to assume that they must all therefore be wrong.
Example (c) seems to me to involve a double incongruity. A man dancing in treacle is an odd case of a man dancing and, at first sight anyway, an even odder instance to liken to the activity of philosophizing. In (d) , under what concept is the walrus subsuming shoes, ships, sealing wax, cabbages and kings? Perhaps the whole set is being subsumed under the concept of group of objects for discussion, (e) obviously involves the oddity of calling the smallest item in a series 'large'.
IV
What sort of account is to be given of incongruous subsumption of instances under a concept? Clearly the instances incongruously subsumed are different in some way from the standard instances falling under the concept. But in what way? Sometimes the subsumed instance just does not belong to the concept at all: the remark made by the Tory spokesman is not a remark favourable to his party. Sometimes indeed the instance isn't the sort of thing which could belong to the concept in question, as in those cases involving category mistakes: recently someone of my acquaintance stopped at a garage to ask how to get onto a projected motorway which appeared on her A.A. map-a projected motorway is not a special sort of motorway. On the other hand a man dancing in treacle is a case of a man dancing-the point is that it is not a typical case. Again, standard groups of topics for discussion differ from the walrus's in that the topics are coherently related. It is because conversations should be, or (more doubtfully) typically are, more coherent than that projected by the walrus that the latter is regarded as different from the former.
There is more than one way, then, in which incongruous instances differ from paradigm instances of the concept and no doubt these types shade off into one another. The objects of humour are so various partly because the modes of incongruity are various.
If incongruity amounts (for present purposes) to incongruous subsumption under a concept, and this is to be analysed in terms of the difference between the subsumed instance(s) and the standard instances of the concept, why not dispense with all this admittedly artificial talk about concepts and just talk about the incongruous assimilation of instances to one another? This, however, would be inadequate, for any object may properly be assimilated to any other given a context which provides a concept under which both naturally fall, and we can always in principle find or form a concept under which both instances fall as standard instances. When there is a particular concept, however, under which one of the instances is thought, it helps to determine the limits of proper assimilation of other objects to that instance.
2
In the majority of cases there seems to be some good reason for the subsumption of the wayward instance under the concept in question, apart from the intention to amuse. Perhaps from one point of view the subsumption is perfectly correct and congruous, or someone thinks that it is congruous, (Cf. example (c).) However, I do not think that, pace Schopenhauer, this is absolutely necessary-(d) might serve as a counterexample. I think that it is a common but not invariable feature of the objects of amusement. V What about the stock objections to traditional versions of the incongruity theory, then? I think that it is quite easy to see that they cannot be invoked yet against the stronger version which I have begun to elaborate. All that has been claimed so far is that the apparently incongruous is the formal object of amusement. It is no good now saying that there are many instances of incongruity which are not amusing, for in saying that the apparently incongruous is the formal object of amusement all we are saying is that nothing can (logically) amuse someone unless he sees it as incongruous, that seeing it as incongruous is a necessary condition of his finding it humorous. We are not saying that it is a sufficient condition for his finding it amusing, we are not saying that if he sees it as incongruous he is bound to be amused by it. To say that 'what is dirty' gives the formal object of cleaning is to say that nothing can be cleaned unless it is dirty, not that anything dirty will be cleaned.
Even so, it may still be objected that what makes (a) funny, for example, is not just the queer assimilation of symphony music to mere tunes, but our knowledge of Ryle's own character as revealed in his behaviour and writings, (b) is funny (to those with non-conservative sympathies) because the remark seems to them to come very near to the truth. And so on. But this objection need not worry us yet since my revised account is not yet complete. All that needs to be pointed out at the moment is that a specification of the formal object of q> ing need not contain a full explanation of why things are <p'd. Saying that only dirty things are cleaned is not to explain why certain things which are dirty are cleaned.
Saying that only what is seen as incongruous is found amusing is not to explain why some things which are seen as incongruous are found amusing.
VI
To see something as incongruous, then, is not necessarily to be amused by it. What is the difference between a man who finds something he is doing, perceiving or thinking about, odd and who is not amused by it, and someone who is amused by it? What is a man denying who, while admitting that he sees something as incongruous, says that it fails to amuse him ? Or, more technically, under what genus is the (apparently) incongruous 3 the formal object of amusement? I shall suggest that
amusement is the enjoyment of (perceiving or thinking of or indulging in) what is seen as incongruous, partly at least because it is seen as incongruous.
HUMOUR AND INCONGRUITY (A qualification follows at the end of the paragraph.) This answer does a little more than answer the question in the technical form I have just put it. It gives more than the genus asked for: the last nine words of the italicized phrase require that apparent incongruity should be a reason for the enjoyment which is involved in amusement. I think that this proviso is necessary, even though we are not left with a simple definition per genus et differentiam after all. A man might enjoy something which he incidentally regarded as incongruous, but if the incongruity were no reason for his enjoyment I see no reason to think he would be amused. A man who was enjoying some exotic food which he incidentally regarded as a very odd sort of food would not find the food, or eating the food, amusing if its apparent incongruity did not contribute towards his enjoyment. The object of amusement must be enjoyed partly at least for its apparent incongruity. Moreover, it is necessary to add that the apparent incongruity is not enjoyed just for some ulterior reason (say, because eating odd food is fashionable and you get pleasure from eating it because you know it is fashionable).
In order to be able to evaluate the suggested account of amusement it would be as well to have a satisfactory account of enjoyment, and I doubt whether one has ever been given. However, it does seem to me that the sort of account of enjoyment or pleasure which currently finds favour will fit quite nicely into the suggested account of amusement. Consider that offered by Mr. C. C. W. Taylor in his paper on 'Pleasure' {Analysis Supplement, January, 1963):
'Wanting something because one enjoys it is wanting it for itself...'-but to do what I want for its own sake is not necessarily to enjoy it. 'Someone may, for instance, want the good of humanity, but this is not to say that he wants the good of humanity because he enjoys it, since the assertion that anyone enjoys the good of humanity is senseless' (p. 16).
What cases of wanting x for its own sake are cases of enjoyment, then? Taylor's answer is: those where x is an action or 'passion' (in Hume's sense) of the subject. For example, to enjoy a football match is, strictly, to enjoy watching a football match. Any action which I perform or experience which I have, wanting to perform or have it for its own sake, is necessarily something which I am enjoying. 4 Taylor considers that enjoyment is only a species of pleasure. Kenny has offered a thesis about pleasure in general, which is similar to Taylor's account of enjoyment: 'If an action is done from pleasure, then it is done for its own sake with no ulterior motive or further end in view' {op. cit., p. 144). Kenny seems to be making the same point about pleasure as Taylor is making about enjoyment, but he has formulated it inaccurately. For I can certainly get pleasure from something, for example, working, PHILOSOPHY which is also done for some ulterior motive, for example, money. Compare also William Alston in an article on pleasure in Edwards' Encyclopaedia (New York, 1967) :
'To get pleasure is to have an experience which, as of the moment, one would rather have than not have, on the basis of its felt quality, apart from any further considerations regarding consequences'. (Vol. 6, p. 345.) I shall make use of Taylor's formulation, which says that to enjoy some action, activity or experience of one's own is to perform or have it, wanting to do so for its own sake. This must not be understood as implying that the action or experience is necessarily a fulfilment of an antecedent desire, for it is clear that some enjoyment is not preceded by any desire for what we are enjoying; but the object of the enjoyment must be something which we are wanting at the time of the enjoyment. Thus Ryle says of a man who enjoyed gardening: 'he dug, wanting to dig and not wanting to do anything else (or nothing) instead' (The Concept of Mind, London, 1949, p. 108) .
I do not believe that Taylor's account of enjoyment is entirely satisfactory, but I think that it may be on the right lines. I shall consider two possible deficiencies. Suppose I am watching a film at the cinema, wanting to watch it for its own sake, but that my enjoyment is completely spoilt by the sound of dance music coming from the palais next door. Here we seem to have a case which fits the proposed account of enjoyment and yet is not itself a case of enjoyment. But it may be granted that this is not a serious difficulty, and that it can be overcome by requiring a more determinate description of what is wanted. In the case envisaged I do not want to watch the film in those conditions: watching a film whose soundtrack is partially obliterated by dance music is not something I want for its own sake, I want to watch the film without the dance music and that is what I am not doing.
A more serious difficulty, however, cannot be met without modifying the account. It seems to me possible that a man may work as an academic philosopher, wanting to do this for itself, but that he may not literally enjoy his work; it will give him satisfaction, presumably, but that is not necessarily quite the same thing. Russell couldn't enjoy writing Principia Mathematica because of the immense intellectual effort involved in it. I agree that it is probable that what Russell wanted for its own sake here was the finished product rather than the actual process of composition (see footnote 4), but it is surely not impossible that he should have wanted the composing for its own sake. Or what about a puritan who values selfabnegation for its own sake and who fasts, wanting to fast for the sake of fasting; need he enjoy fasting ? Perhaps, then, the absence of much effort or the absence of constraint is an essential feature of enjoyment. On the other hand it does seem possible to enjoy exerting oneself or tackling something which is really difficult. Maybe the enjoyment doesn't come until the exertion is well under way, or what is enjoyed is the realization that you are achieving something difficult. It would be optimistic to think that a clause added to Taylor's account to cope with the point about effort would result in an adequate definition of enjoyment, but in default of having a better one I shall make use of it.
We can now substitute this account of enjoyment in the suggested account of amusement. If the object of amusement for S is an action or experience of S, then he will want to indulge in that action or have that experience for its own sake because 5 he sees it as incongruous. If the object of amusement is an object of S's perception or thought, then he will perceive or think of that object for the sake of doing so because 5 he sees the object as incongruous. Furthermore, it must (in the appropriate sense) be easy, involve no great effort, to persist in perceiving the object, or in the acting or experiencing. If it does require such an effort, we may be said to appreciate humorous qualities in the object, but we may not properly be said to be amused at it. For example, to be amused at the man we see slipping on a banana skin is to enjoy watching him slip because we see this as incongruous-that is, to watch him slip, wanting to watch the (apparently) odd incident for the sake of watching it-and (in some sense) to be able to do this without effort. The account of enjoyment I have used seems to fit quite nicely. 6 VII I want now to revert to the second sort of criticism of incongruity theories, that incongruity is not always what really makes something funny. What Ryle says in my example (a) may well only seem funny because it is Ryle who said it, and so on. Now in claiming that amusement is roughly the enjoyment of what is seen as incongruous we certainly do not explain why it is that certain things when seen as incongruous evoke enjoyment and others do not, we say almost nothing about the various features of the former which account for the enjoyment. It is true that I have insisted that a reason for the enjoyment in cases of amusement must be the apparent incongruity of the object, but I do not claim that it will always be the only reason or provide us with a full causal explanation of the enjoyment. It seems to me that superiority and relief from restraint theories provide partial answers to the demand for this sort of explanation and that it is not a demand that can be met by a purely philosophical theory. Some sort of empirical investigation is surely necessary to satisfy it. Seen in this light superiority theories and relief from restraint theories are not competitors with my version of the incongruity theory but are complementary to it. Whether they are satisfactory complements is a matter for psychologists, biologists and literary critics. On the face of it it seems unlikely that all amusement is in fact produced by relief from restraint, or that amusement always involves glorying in others' apparent inferiority, but at the same time it looks as if there are some cases of each. PHILOSOPHY VIII I do not know whether there are any clear counterexamples to my account of the humorous, whether there are, for example, any cases of enjoyment of the apparently incongruous which are not cases of amusement. Suppose a man is looking at a picture and is enjoying this experience, and suppose he says he likes the picture because of the incongruity of its content. Moreover he likes the incongruity for its own sake, not for any insight, say, that the picture gives him into the nature of the world. Must we say he finds the picture amusing? I find it difficult to say.
There is a more systematic way of searching for counterexamples than the random construction of imaginary cases. Monro tests each of the theories he considers by trying them out as accounts of a number of different types of humour-breaches of the usual order of events, forbidden breaches, indecency, importing into one situation what belongs to another, word-play, and so on. I shall not attempt this somewhat tedious task in the present paper, but it is a task which is available to any sceptical reader.
University of Nottingham.
'I shall use the expression 'apparently incongruous' for what is seen as incongruous, although it is not as appropriate as I would wish.
*I think it is likely that there are alternative, but fundamentally equivalent, accounts of incongruity, say in terms of conflicting concepts under which an instance is being subsumed, or simply in terms of an instance's being subsumed under a concept under which it does not fall. My remarks on incongruous subsumption are not intended to give a complete, non-circular definition of 'incongruous'.
'See footnote 1. Taylor points out that it must really be the action or passion itself that is wanted, not an end-product of it, unless this is also an action or passion. Thus, if I write a philosophical paper wanting to do so for its own sake, I may want either (i) 'my writing this paper', or (ii) 'there being a paper on this topic written by me', and only in the first case will I necessarily enjoy writing it. Obviously I can write a paper I want to write for its own sake without particularly enjoying what I do, but in that case I will want (ii) as distinct from (i).
'But it needn't be only because. «I think it may be possible to define some other concepts in the same family as amusement in a similar way-I am thinking of some particular species of amusement. What is it to find something ludicrous or farcical or comic or witty, for example? Sometimes a definition can be obtained by narrowing the genus, enjoyment: e.g., rinding something hilarious or mirthful is a species of more intense enjoyment, or perhaps of enjoyment the expression of which is typically uninhibited. Sometimes the formal object under the genus enjoyment can be restricted: to find something comic is not just to find it incongruous but to find it obviously and unsubtly so. In the case of finding something witty either procedure seems available: it is not just enjoyment but intellectual enjoyment, enjoyment requiring some exercise of the intellect. Again, if something is found to be witty it is found to be subtly incongruous. In this case the two methods of definition are equivalent.
